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of widow's benefits. (The courts do not reason that it is the avail-
ability of support which is controlling, but speak in terms of such
an annulled marriage having sufficient validity to preclude resump-
tion of benefits.) In this area Congress should act to standardize rights
to benefits throughout the United States.
Edna D. Barber
FORMAL AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes admonishes us that "men must turn square corners
when they deal with the Government."' This "Square Corner Doc-
trine" finds application in the extensive and expanding area of gov-
ernment contracting. This note surveys briefly some ways in which
a contract between the United States Government and a private
businessman or corporation may be at variance with a contract be-
tween private parties based upon common law principles.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
PRIVATE CONTRACT TERMS
A. Sovereign Immunity
Most areas of dissimilarity between government contracts and pri-
vate commercial contracts involve mandatory clauses which are in-
serted into the government contract and which a contractor must
accept if it chooses to do business with the government. However,
one obvious dissimilarity derives from the nature of one of the con-
tracting parties. This is the immunity of the sovereign to suit by
the contractor. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has the effect of
limiting the contractor's legal remedy for breach of contract by the
government to such situations and to such forums as the government
chooses.' The parties to a private contract need not contend with
such a defense.
Prior to 1855 a government contractor's legal remedy for breach
of contract by the government was limited to congressional action.
The Act of 1855' constituted a definitive step in the limitation of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity by establishing the Court of
I Rock Island, A.L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
2 See e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1918); Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287 (1927).
3 10 STAT. 612.
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Claims in which a contractor could pursue its remedies for breach of
contract. A disappointed claimant had no opportunity of appeal until
1863 when a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was authorized.4 The passage of the Tucker Act in
1887r permitted suit to be brought against the United States not
only in the Court of Claims' but also in the United States district
courts if the claim was less than $10,000.' Such suits had to be
based "upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the Govern-
ment of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated,
in cases not sounding in tort. . . ."' For most purposes this equal-
ized government and private contract remedies.
Related to sovereign immunity is the distinction between common
law rules of agency governing the private contract, and rules appli-
cable to one who purports to act for the government. A government
agent cannot bind the government beyond his actual authority.'
The common law principles of apparent authority and estoppel are
not available to the contractor who acts in reliance upon instructions
received from a mistaken or negligent government agent."0
Another distinction relating to sovereign immunity is that an at-
tempted revocation of a bid may be ineffective under a regulation"
providing that a bid may not be withdrawn after formal opening.
This is contrary to the common law principle of contracts under
which an offeror may generally withdraw, at any time prior to ac-
ceptance, an offer which has not been given for consideration.'"
This question was litigated and resolved in favor of the government
in Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States."8
B. Disputes Clause
The Disputes clause'4 most clearly sets apart a government con-
tract from a private contract and was first employed in the late
4 12 STAT. 765.
5 24 STAT. 505 (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491 (1958)).
6 24 STAT. 505 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958)).
7 24STAT. 505 (now28U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2) (1958)).
8 24 STAT. 505.
9 Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243 (1912).
10 Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
11 41 U.S.C.A. App., § 54.12 (1957).
12 W-ImSTON, CONTA!CTS § 55 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATwEmT, CoNTmACrs,
§§ 35(e), 41-45 (1932).
Is 109 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
"4 Armed Services Procurement Begs. § 7-203.12 (1958).
"DISPUTES (JAN. 1958)
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concern-
ing a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of
by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce
his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and con-
clusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the
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1880's.'" The purpose of the clause is to provide a means whereby
adjustments may be made and errors corrected on an administrative
level, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of damage claims that might
otherwise arise. The Disputes clause provides that any dispute con-
cerning a question of fact arising under a government contract
which is not settled by agreement between the parties shall be de-
cided by the government contracting officer. This clause gives one
party to the contract the sole right to decide a disputed question of
fact. A private commercial contract containing a similar clause might
not be upheld by the courts on the grounds of constituting an un-
reasonable arbitration clause or of making the dominant party's
promise of performance too indefinite for legal enforcement.'"
The clause permits an appeal by a disappointed contractor to the
secretary of the government agency within thirty days after receipt
of the contracting officer's adverse decision. Failure to exhaust this
administrative remedy precludes judicial review"r by depriving the
court of jurisdiction. 8
To implement administrative review of the contractor's appeal,
the following government agencies have set up boards of contract
appeal: Department of Defense, Department of the Interior, Army
Corps of Engineers, Post Office Department, Veterans' Administra-
tion, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, General
Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. These boards serve to
mitigate a potential inequity in the Disputes clause, viz., that of hav-
ing as the final arbitrator of fact one of the interested parties to the
contract.
Recognizing that the contracting officer and the head of the agency
are not necessarily impartial expert arbitrators, are not held subject
I
Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written
appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final
and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to
have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as
necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In
connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor
shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in sup-
port of his appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Con-
tractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in
accordance with the Contracting Officer s decision.
(b) This 'Disputes' clause does not preclude consideration of law questions
in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above; provided,
that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the decision
of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of
law."
IS NA y CONTRACT LAW § 1.14 (2d ed. 1959).
16 WmLISTON, CONTRACTS § 42 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS
§ 32 (1932).
17 Pyle v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 853 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
18 United States v. Smith, 152 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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to professional standards as in commercial arbitration, and are em-
ployed by one of the parties to the contract, the Secretary of Defense
has composed the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) of fifteen attorneys, all of whom must have been admitted
to practice before the highest court of a state or the District of
Columbia.1
In the actual employment of this disputes procedure, what is the
finality of the government agency's fact decision? This question was
in issue in United States v. Wanderlich. ° The United States Su-
preme Court held (three Justices dissenting) that a judicial review
of an administrative decision of a question of fact under the Disputes
clause is limited to cases in which such decision was founded upon
"fraud, alleged and proved."21 Fraud was defined by the Court as a
conscious wrong-doing and an intention to cheat or be dishonest.
The dissenting opinions would have broadened the basis for judicial
review "to reverse an official whose conduct is plainly out of
bounds whether he is fraudulent, perverse, captious, incompetent, or
just palpably wrong . . .,2 and also for a "gross mistake as
necessarily to imply bad faith...23
The majority opinion invited Congress, if it considered the Court's
definition of fraud to be too restrictive, to legislate on the matter.
Congress accepted the invitation and passed the first statute dealing
with the Disputes clause, often referred to as the Wunderlich Act.'
This act extended the grounds for judicial review and provided that
an administrative decision was final unless the decision was "fradu-
lent [sicl or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evi-
dence."
25
The Court of Claims and the district courts have not been in
agreement on the precise sort of judicial review available to the con-
tractor who is disappointed in the contracting officer's determination
of a fact question. The Court of Claims has held" that the con-
tractor is entitled to a de novo review of every aspect of its case.
On the other hand, the district courts and courts of appeal have
held that the review is limited to facts appearing in the original
administrative record of the hearing before the board of appeals.
2 9 Aiu SERVICES POCREMENT REGS., APP. A, PART 1 (1963) (Charter for
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals).
20 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
21 Id. at 100.
22 Id. at 102.
23 Id. at 103.
24 68 STAT. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
25 Ibid.
26 H. L. Yoh Co., Inc. v. United States, 288 F. 2d 493, 496 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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Therefore, when the appellant contractor believed that its case could
be best presented by introducing evidence other than the record of
the administrative review, it would have behooved the contractor to
litigate in the Court of Claims.
These conflicting interpretations reached the United States Su-
preme Court in Carlo Bianchi and Co., Inc. v. United States." The
contractor was awarded a contract by the Army Corps of Engineers
to construct a flood control dam. This work involved digging a
water diversion tunnel. During the construction of the tunnel, un-
foreseen conditions created extreme hazards for workmen and the
contractor was forced to make additional expenditures for protection
of the workmen.
The contracting officer denied the contractor's claim for additional
compensation. After pursuing its administrative remedies through the
Corps of Engineers Board of Claims and Appeals, the contractor
brought an action for breach of contract in the Court of Claims,
alleging that the decisions of the contracting officer and the board
were "capricious or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessary
to imply bad faith, or were not supported by substantial evidence."2
The Court of Claims allowed the contractor to recover after hearing
evidence de novo.
The government appealed to the Supreme Court contending that
the trial in the Court of Claims should have been limited to evi-
dence contained in the record of the board proceedings. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and found for the government. The Court,
relying on an earlier case,2" held that the function of the Court of
Claims in matters governed by the Disputes clause is in effect to give
an extremely limited review of the administrative decision, and to
give such previous determinations conclusive effect. Only where the
plaintiff has pleaded fraud can the court receive new evidence.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in Bianchi, the Court
of Claims in Stein Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. United States"0 again
based its decision on evidence de novo. In this instance the govern-
ment had failed to make a timely objection to the admission of new
evidence during trial in the Court of Claims. The court believed
that the Bianchi case set forth a procedural or evidentiary require-
ment and not a jurisdictional requirement; and therefore by failing
to object to the consideration of evidence de novo, the government
had waived the prohibition expressed in the Bianchi case.
27 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
28 Id. at 719.
29 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 620 (1878).
30 No. 389-59, Ct. CL, July 1963, 9 CCF 72,183.
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This holding would not be of permanent importance since the
government could object in future cases to the introduction of new
evidence. However, the Court of Claims also noted that the Bianchi
decision prohibited it from considering evidence de novo only in
regard to questions of fact, and that the court still had general
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to consider all evidence relating
to questions of law notwithstanding the Wunderlich Act or the
Bianchi case. In its recent decision distinguishing the Bianchi holding,
IWPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,31 the Court of Claims stated
that a question involving the proper interpretation of a contract
specification is a mixed question of law and fact, and de novo evi-
dence may be offered.
From these decisions it appears that the Disputes clause and the
applicable appellate procedures provide means for settling fact dis-
putes under government contracts which are different from those
means available for determining private contract disputes.
C. Changed Conditions Clause
In a private contract a question sometimes arises whether one
party is entitled to further consideration due to additional work
being required on his part because of unforeseeable or changed con-
ditions. The problem has been settled in private contracts in many
ways such as rescission, reformation, cancellation, or modification by
mutual consent. These solutions recognize the common law principle
that impossibility of performance may excuse one's duty to perform."
The principle is also extended to certain cases of impracticability of
performance.33
In a government contract a limited solution to the problem is
dictated by the mandatory inclusion of the Changed Conditions
clause. A typical example of this clause34 provides that where the
-1 No. 256-59, Ct. Cl., Oct. 1963, 9 CCF 5 72,289.
32 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
33 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47 (1944).
34 AR-Nma SERvicEs Pnocu Rvm r tLcs. § 7-602.4 (1961).
"CHANGED CONDITIONS (NOV. 1961)
The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are disturbed,
notify the Contracting Officer in writing of: (a) subsurface or latent physi-
cal conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated in this
contract, or (b) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature,
differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recog-
nized as inhering in work of the character provided for in this contract. The
Contracting Officer shall promptly investigate the conditions, and if he finds
that such conditions do so materially differ and cause an increase or de-
crease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for, performance of
this contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract shall
be modified in writing accordingly. Any claim of the Contractor for adjust-
ment hereunder shall not be allowed unless he has given notice as above
required; or unless the Contracting Officer grants a further period of time
before the date of final payment under the contract. If the parties fail to agree
upon the adjustment to be made, the dispute shall be determined as provided
in the 'Disputes' clause of this contract."
196,41
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contractor encounters latent or unknown physical conditions differ-
ing materially from those contemplated in the contract or from those
ordinarily encountered in that type of work, it shall be permitted
to make a claim to the contracting officer for equitable adjustment
of the contract cost. If the parties fail to agree on the amount of
the contractor's claim, the question is then settled in accordance with
the Disputes clause.
The purpose of the Changed Conditions clause is to allow a con-
tractor to prepare its bid without including a contingency for un-
foreseeable or changed conditions which it may encounter. In theory
then, these conditions requiring an upward adjustment in contract
price will cause the government additional cost only when actually
encountered. This clause provides an orderly method for handling
the administrative problems resulting from the occurrence of unfore-
seeable conditions.
D. Changes Clause
A large number of the cases reaching the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) involve the question of an equitable
adjustment in contract price, or cost and fee, resulting from changes
made to the original contractual task. This question is covered by
the Changes clause, one form of which appears in cost-reimburse-
ment supply contracts.35 the clause provides that the contracting
officer may at any time make changes in the drawings, designs, or
specifications of the items to be furnished under the contract, or in
the method of shipping and packing, or in the place of delivery.
ss ARu:E SRVICES P.ROCURF'MNT REGS. § 7-203.2 (1958).
"CHANGES (JAN. 1958)
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and with-
out notice to the sureties, if any, make changes, within the general scope of
this contract, in any one or more of the following: (i) drawings, designs,
or specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to be specially manu-
factured for the Government in accordance therewith; (ii) method of ship-
ment or packing; (iii) place of delivery; and (iv) the amount of Govern-
ment-furnished property. If any such change causes an increase or decrease
in the estimated cost of, or the time required for the performance of any
part of the work under this contract, whether changed or not changed by
any such order, or otherwise affects any other provision of this contract, an
equitable adjustment shall be made (i) in the estimated cost or delivery
schedule, or both, (ii) in the amount of any fixed fee to be paid to the
Contractor, and (iii) in such other provisions of the contract as may be so
affected, and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly. Any
claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted
within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of the
notification of change; provided, however, that the Contracting Officer, if
he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and act upon any
such claim asserted at any time prior to final payment under this contract.
Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question
of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled 'Disputes.'
However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding
with the contract as changed."
[Vol. I
NOTES
This clause further provides that if any such change required by
the contracting officer causes an increase or decrease in the con-
tractor's cost to perform the contract an equitable adjustment shall
be made in the contract cost, delivery schedule and fee.
The element which makes this procedure of revising the con-
tractual task most variant from private contracting is the require-
ment that it is the contractor's duty to proceed with the work as
changed unilaterally by the contracting officer. The contractor has
no privilege of first negotiating a new price for this additional task
before beginning work. Where negotiations fail to establish the equi-
table adjustment to be made in schedule, cost, or fee, the contractor
may appeal the government's findings in accordance with the Dis-
putes clause.
An interesting facet of the changes problem is whether the con-
tractor is entitled not only to his additional costs but to increased
fee for the additional work, where he originally contracted to per-
form a stated task on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF) basis.
Although there are relatively few cases in point, the general rule
which seems to have evolved in CPFF contract cases is that the
contractor may obtain an increase in fixed fee for additional work
which was not originally contemplated by the parties, and is prop-
erly authorized by a change order, even though the additional work
is within the general scope of the original contract.
In one example36 the contractor agreed to build a bacteriological
laboratory facility at an estimated cost of $8,000,000. The actual
cost ran to over $16,000,000 due to additional tasks unforeseeable
at the time of contracting and discovered only during the perform-
ance of the contract. In allowing an increase in fixed fee the
ASBCA reasoned that the original fee was based on the cost of
performing the task as contemplated by the parties at the inception
of the contract, and that since the added requirements specified by
the government increased the cost of performance, it would be equi-
table to allow an increase in fee.
In another construction contract an increase in fixed fee was de-
nied. 7 Here the increase in cost resulted from schedule delays be-
yond the control of the contractor, but not from additional work
and services formally directed by the government contracting officer.
Therefore, the ASBCA held that the situation did not fall within
the Changes clause and no additional fee would be allowed.
30 H. K. Ferguson Co., No. 2876, Bd. Cont. Appeals, 6 CCF ff 62,302 (1957).
3 Penker Construction Co., No. 1954, Bd. Cont. Appeals, 6 CCF 1 61,727
(1955).
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It has also been held by the ASBCA that the contractor's fee
may be adjusted upward where his claim is based upon work within
the general scope of the contract but not contemplated in the plans
and specifications as drawn."8 In addition, fee adjustment has been
authorized where the changes resulted in a project of a different
nature from that which was originally contemplated by the parties."9
The effect of the Changes clause is to place the contractor in the
position of having to begin work at the direction of the contracting
officer without the opportunity first to negotiate the cost and fee of
the additional task. This provision is not a term commonly found
in private contracts, perhaps out of concern that such a provision
might be construed as rendering the private contract too indefinite
to be enforceable.4"
E. Termination Clause
The Termination clause4' is another example of a government
contract provision which differs from private contract terms. This
extensive clause provides basically that the government may, at any
time, at and for its convenience or for default of the contractor,
terminate a government contract. Probably the first recorded case42
involving government use of a termination for convenience provi-
sion dates back to 1875.
While a termination for default clause is not an unusual term
in private contracts, the government termination for convenience
clause presents some distinguishable features. Contrary to traditional
private contract law,4 this clause specifies that the government will
not be liable for any of the contractor's anticipated profits and will
be liable only for a reasonable profit based on actual work performed.
The procedure set forth to fix the amount of the contractor's re-
covery after a convenience termination begins with the contractor
and the government attempting to negotiate the contractor's settle-
ment claim. If agreement cannot be reached, the government, ex
parte, determines the amount to be paid to the contractor in ac-
cordance with formulae set forth in the Termination clause.44 If the
contractor wishes to appeal this decision, he may do so under the
procedure set forth in the Disputes clause.
ss James Stewart Corp., No. 384, Bd. Cont. Appeals, 3 CCF 103 (1942).
S9 Allen & Kelley, et al, No. 733, Bd. Cont. Appeals, 3 CCF 1 (1944).
40 See, WILuSTON, CoNTmAcrs § 42 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEmENT, CoN-
TRACTS § 32, ILLUS. 6 (1932).
41 17 CFR 1791 (1952), AwrmD SEMVICES PROCUREMET REs. (ASPR) § VIII
(1954).
42 United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321.
43 Cf., Wells v. National Life Assn. of Hartford, 99 Fed. 222 (5th Cir. 1900);
United States v. Beham, 110 U.S. 168 (1884).
44 ASPR § VIIIPnT 5 (1944).
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The Termination clause was involved in the recent Court of
Claims decision in G. L. Christian and Associates v. United States. 5
The government terminated Christian's contract for construction of
a housing project. Due to what was probably an inadvertent omis-
sion by the contracting officer, the contract did not include the stand-
ard Termination clause. Under common law principles, the contrac-
tor could be entitled to the value of the contract less the cost to
complete his performance4 The plaintiff claimed this amount as
damages. The contracting officer refused to honor the contractor's
claim for full anticipated profits but offered to insert the Termination
clause into the contract subsequent to the termination action. The
contractor understandably declined to accept, and thereupon filed suit
in the Court of Claims.
The court found in favor of the government on the basis that,
although the termination clause was not actually negotiated into the
contract by the parties, the contract would be construed as if it con-
tained the clause. The court reasoned that because the Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Act of 1947"7 authorized the issuance of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), the regulations
had the full force and effect of federal law. Since the regulations
required the inclusion of the Termination clause in the contract,
the contract would be construed as if containing the Termination
clause. Thus a situation may exist in which a government contract
includes a clause not expressly incorporated into the contract docu-
ment.
The result in the Christian case goes beyond exemplifying a mere
formal terminology distinction and extends into the area of doctrinal
differences in interpretation of government vis-a-vis private contract
obligations.
It is interesting to speculate whether the same result would obtain
where the contractor wishes to avail himself of a provision which
is required by the procurement regulations to be contained in, but
which is omitted from, the actual contract document.
F. Renegotiation Clause
The policy of renegotiation provides a prime illustration of a dis-
parity between government and private contractual agreements. The
Renegotiation clause is required to be included in Government
contracts.
48
4s 312 F. 2d 418 (Ct. C.), cert. denied, 32 U. S. L. Week 3220 (U.S. Dec. 17,
1963).
46 REsTATEMNT, CoNT-Acrs § 329 (1932).
47 70 STAT. 127 (now 10 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 2301-14 (1958).)
48 ASPR § 7-103.13 (1959).
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The implementation of renegotiation began with an executive
order promulgated in 1942."9 This order allowed government in-
spection of a contractor's accounting records. If it were determined
that the contractor's profits were excessive, the executive order au-
thorized the Price Adjustment Board to secure a refund. The prin-
ciple of renegotiation was subsequently expanded by congressional
legislation," culminating in the Renegotiation Act of 1951."' The
purpose of the act is to safeguard the public purse from unreasonable
profit taking by private contractors. It is applied where the contrac-
tor's profits are found to be unreasonable after the required work
has been performed.
The Renegotiation Act established a separate Renegotiation Board,
which is not part of any procurement agency, to supervise the re-
negotiation procedures. The following procedure is stipulated: a
contractor is required to file an annual fiscal report showing profits
made during the previous year under government contracts contain-
ing the clause. The Renegotiation Board and the contractor meet,
if the Board has determined that the contractor's profits may be
excessive, to negotiate the excess amount. If no agreement can be
reached, the Board then sets an amount to be repaid to the govern-
ment. The contractor has a right of appeal to the Tax Court which
he must exercise within thirty days of receiving the Renegotiation
Board's final determination.
This type of clause would be a strange member in a private con-
tract. The inclusion of such a clause in a private contract would be
substituting for a definite and agreed upon term (the price) a more
indefinite term ("reasonable" profit). The right of one party uni-
laterally to amend his duty of payment under the contract subsequent
to the other party's performance would probably be held to create
an illusory contract unenforceable at law. 2
III. CONCLUSION
A private corporation or individual contracting with the govern-
ment today undertakes greater duties than did the eighteenth century
supplier who contracted to equip a naval force to defend against
Barbary priates. This is due to development of certain formal and
doctrinal differences between standard government and private con-
49 Exec. Order No. 9127,7 Fed. Beg. 2753 (1942).
so 56 STAT. 226, 245, 246 (1942).
51 65 STAT. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1211-33 (1958).
52 See, WmmSTON, CoNTRAcrs § 42 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTs
§ 32, ILLus. 6 (1932).
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tracts. Examples of formal differences in contractual terms are the
Disputes, Changed Conditions, Changes, Termination and Renego-
tiation clauses appearing in government contracts. More subtle per-
haps are the doctrinal variations; for instance, the principle of sov-
ereign immunity, and the Court of Claims' holding in the Christian
case which bound the contractor by terms not appearing in the con-
tract document.
The authors do not regard these peculiarities of government con-
tracting as inappropriate, because today's government contract is
more than a procurement agreement. It is also an instrument
through which the government executes socio-economic policies such
as minimum wages, fair employment practices and small business
aid. As a result, a contractor who elects to deal with the government
must be prepared to undertake larger responsibilities, turning even
"squarer comers."
Charles A. Lynch
Edward C. Reading
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